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MOVE OVER IPOS:
UNICORN DIRECT LISTINGS MAY BE THE NEW
MYTHICAL BEASTS IN TOWN
Tatum Sornborger*
ABSTRACT
Most people think of “going public” as an Initial Public Offering
(IPO), but as IPOs have boomed and busted over the past decade, the
direct listing has emerged as an unconventional but viable way to
raise capital. The direct listing approach was uncovered by one
rebellious “unicorn,” a term used to describe privately held
companies with valuations exceeding one billion dollars. By
circumventing the traditional IPO process, Spotify prompted both
the SEC and major stock exchanges to examine direct listings and
promulgate rules for future offerings. Though these rules are still
developing, companies now have a clear path to follow in Spotify’s
footsteps and forgo the traditional IPO.
The development of the direct listing is important not only because
of the regulatory response, but also because of what it might reveal
about the truth behind unicorn valuations. Many economists and
industry professionals suspect that the reason behind several recent
high-profile IPO failures may lie in excessively high valuations that
do not correspond to reality. Many companies that went public
through an IPO continue to trade well below their offering prices
despite their private market success.
IPOs are still trending upward. But if unicorns continue to struggle
to maintain massive pre-IPO valuations in the public markets, others
may see the allure of the cost-saving and more transparent direct
listing approach.
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INTRODUCTION
Spotify, with one unprecedented move, may go down in history as
paving the way for a start-up financial rebellion.1 In 2018, Spotify
surprised the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) by rejecting
the status quo through a decision not to launch an Initial Public Offering
(“IPO”),2 which, under the Securities Act of 1933 (the “Securities Act”),

1. Rupa Briggs, Direct listings: The IPOs of the new decade or a passing phase?,
WHITE & CASE (2020), https://www.whitecase.com/sites/default/files/2020-03/directlistings-ipos-new-decade-or-passing-phase.pdf [https://perma.cc/2FGT-NGHT].
2. Id. An IPO is the first time an issuer offers securities to the general public. See
SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, SEC PUB. NO. 133 (2/13), INVESTOR BULLETIN: INVESTING IN
AN IPO 1 (Feb. 25, 2013) [hereinafter SEC INVESTOR BULLETIN], https://www.sec.gov/
investor/alerts/ipo-investorbulletin.pdf [https://perma.cc/T7V3-VTL7].
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is a start-up’s celebrated coming-out party.3 Why did a company that
was worth $20 billion decide to deviate from the accepted path and
forgo its opportunity to be the next hot, new IPO? More importantly,
what did they do instead? Is what they did legal, and did they really start
a revolution? This Note will attempt to answer these questions by
looking at Spotify’s path and the path of other companies that have since
followed suit. These companies, called “unicorns,” have one important
quality in common: their billion-dollar valuations.4 The valuation of
these companies puts them in an exclusive group, the “unicorn club.” 5
This Note will discuss how certain companies make it to the club, and
why some decide not to journey to the IPO promised land with the rest
of the unicorn herd.
Imagine a CEO of a successful start-up, excited about the prospect
of offering common stock of her billion-dollar company to the public.
Then, this CEO begins to read newspaper headlines titled, “The Uber
IPO Was Not a Failure, But IPOs in General Are a Mess”6 and “Why
IPO Investors Are Set Up for Failure.”7 The CEO starts to think that
there has to be another way to stay successful without the risk of guests
not showing up for her coming-out party. After all, she does not want a
failed IPO.8 Following in the footsteps of Spotify, the CEO skips the
IPO, files a registration form with the SEC in accordance with the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Exchange Act”) and the stock
exchanges’ new rules, and lists her company’s common stock directly

3.
4.

See id.
See Jennifer S. Fan, Regulating Unicorns: Disclosure and the New Private
Economy, 57 B.C. L. REV. 583, 583 (2016). “Unicorn” was a term coined by Aileen
Lee, the founder of Cowboy Ventures in 2013. Id. at 586.
5. Id. at 587; see also Aileen Lee, Welcome to the Unicorn Club: Learning from
Billion-Dollar Startups, TECHCRUNCH (Nov. 2, 2013), https://techcrunch.com/2013/
11/02/welcome-to-the-unicorn-club [https://perma.cc/UXH5-W8MJ].
6. Vitaliy Katsenelson, The Uber IPO Was Not A Failure. But IPOs in General
Are a Mess, FORTUNE (June 6, 2019, 4:07 PM), https://fortune.com/2019/06/06/uberipo-success-or-failure [https://perma.cc/SFV6-6VL2].
7. Ross Gerber, Why IPO Investors Are Set Up For Failure, GERBER KAWASAKI
BLOG (2017), https://gerberkawasaki.com/article/why-ipo-investors-are-set-up-forfailure [https://perma.cc/SFV6-6VL2].
8. When an IPO “fails,” it essentially means that the company failed to make
money after going public due to an inability to attract new investors. See Nicholas J.
Price, What Happens When Your IPO Fails?, DILIGENTINSIGHTS (Nov. 13, 2019),
https://insights.diligent.com/ipo/what-happens-when-your-ipo-fails
[https://perma.cc/JL8N-T86G]. For example, Uber and Lyft “haven’t done well after
IPO.” Id.

218

FORDHAM JOURNAL
OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW

[Vol. 26

on a securities exchange without the help of underwriters. Like Spotify,
this hypothetical company has thus rejected the IPO train and hopped on
a new train: direct listing. In summary, this Note will dive into the inner
workings of this revolution and analyze what it entails, which
companies are rejecting the IPO model, how the regulatory scene is
keeping up with this movement, and what it means for the financial
start-up market.
Part I of this Note will discuss the rise of unicorns and how they get
their $1 billion valuation. It will present common questions that many
have already asked, such as whether this valuation is valid and if
unicorns really exist, or if they are as mythical as their name suggests.
Part II will briefly discuss recent IPO mishaps and how some unicorns
have chosen to step away from IPOs in favor of direct listings, the
unusual method undertaken by Spotify. Part II will then walk through
the specific mechanics of a direct listing and discuss how the sudden use
of direct listings over IPOs prompted a change in regulations to support
their usage. Finally, Part III considers whether direct listings are here to
stay, and why that might be.
I. PAPER UNICORNS: MYTHICAL NAME AND MYTHICAL VALUATIONS
Pinterest, WeWork, Uber, SpaceX, and Airbnb all have one thing in
common:9 They all, at one time or another, earned unicorn status. Once
very rare, hence their mythical-creature-inspired namesake, unicorns
have become increasingly common in today’s technological start-up
boom.10 In 2019 alone, there were at least 50 new unicorns from a
variety of industry sectors including fintech, fashion, biotech, and
health.11 As of December 2020, there were more than 500 unicorns
around the world.12 A large number of new unicorns are tech-based13,

9. See James Chen, Unicorn, INVESTOPEDIA (Mar. 31, 2020), https://
www.investopedia.com/terms/u/unicorn.asp [https://perma.cc/BZ95-TJSY].
10. See Fan, supra note 4, at 583.
11. Joanna Glasner, Unicorn Class of 2019: Richer, More Autonomous, and More
American, CRUNCHBASE NEWS (June 12, 2019), https://news.crunchbase.com/news/
unicorn-class-of-2019-richer-more-autonomous-and-more-american
[https://perma.cc/GSR5-EZ4L].
12. The Complete List of Unicorn Companies, CBINSIGHTS (Dec. 2020),
https://www.cbinsights.com/research-unicorn-companies
[https://perma.cc/R3FPRR3E]. This website is continuously updated to reflect the most recent data, with
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and many, if not most, are U.S. based companies.14 These companies
typically earn their unicorn status between four and seven years of
operation.15 However, a few companies have recently reached that status
in only two years.16 Some scholars believe that this has more to do with
valuation methodology than genuine success.17
So, why do venture investors and entrepreneurs care if companies
reach this billion-dollar mark? First, from a logical standpoint, as
venture-capital-supported start-ups continue to grow in size, larger “exit
options” are needed to deliver returns.18 Second, others seem to suggest
that a fervent desire to reach the billion-dollar mark is born not just out
of monetary motivations.19 Steve Butterfield, Slack’s CEO, admitted
that while the number appears arbitrary, for him and for others, it “does
makes a big difference psychologically.”20 According to Butterfield,
“[o]ne billion is better than $800 million because it’s the psychological
threshold for potential customers, employees, and the press.”21 The
desire for large valuations, unfortunately, does not automatically make
them trustworthy, rather, some financial experts argue that many
valuations are unreliable and based on calculations that are neither
accurate nor indicative of future success.22 These same scholars imply
that these seemingly successful companies are nothing more than “paper
unicorns.”23 But how did Butterfield, investors, and employees even get
to the $1 billion number, notwithstanding its potential inaccuracy?

numbers growing every month. See id. If the company is priced over $10 billion, it is
called a “decacorn” and if it is priced over $100 billion it is called a “hectocorn.” Id.
13. See id.
14. See Gene Teare, Monthly Funding Recap October 2020: 14 New Unicorns Are
Born And Funding Holds Steady, CRUNCHBASE NEWS (Nov. 9, 2020), https://news.
crunchbase.com/news/monthly-funding-recap-october [https://perma.cc/V4NT-5KZ6].
15. Id.
16. See id.
17. See infra Part II.
18. See Gary Spencer, Developments in Banking & Financial Law: 2015, 35 REV.
BANKING & FIN. L. 47, 55 (2015) [hereinafter Developments]. These “exit options” are
usually in the form of an IPO. See id.
19. Erin Griffith & Dan Primack, The Age of Unicorns, FORTUNE (Jan. 22, 2015),
https://fortune.com/2015/01/22/the-age-of-unicorns [https://perma.cc/L87R-GJ7Q].
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. See Developments, supra note 18, at 47.
23. Id. at 48. These scholars use the term “paper unicorns” to refer to unicorns that
have not had a liquidity event, such as an IPO, where initial investors are able to cash
out some or all of their shares. See id. IPOs are the most common of such events, but
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A. INTRODUCTION TO VALUATIONS
“Value” is defined differently depending on the legal context in
which it is applied.24 The classical definition of “value” is the price that
a willing buyer and a willing seller settle on using “reasonable
knowledge of relevant facts.”25 This price is not set by the market, a
price that is called “market value,” but is arranged by two willing parties
in an arm’s-length transaction.26 It presumes that both the seller and the
buyer arrive at a price through fair and reasonable negotiations.27
Furthermore, the price is determined based on the parties’ knowledge of
the asset and the presumption that they are acting in their own interests
free from external pressures.28
This classical approach to valuation is used by many sources of
authority such as the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and the SEC.29 But
as a general method, publicly held companies are typically valued by
multiplying the number of shares by their share price.30 Current stock
prices and available number of shares are found on databases such as

others include direct acquisitions by other corporations or private equity firms. See id.
at n.8.
24. SHANNON P. PRATT & ALINA V. NICULITA, THE LAWYER’S BUSINESS
VALUATION HANDBOOK 1 (2d ed. 2010). For example, financial reporting yields
different results than investment value or acquisition value. See generally id.
25. Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-1 (as amended in 1992). The Internal Revenue Code
uses the term “value” throughout its provisions. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 2031 (2018). The
IRS has also released various publications emphasizing its classical approach to the
term. See IRS, Publication 561 (02/2020), Determining the Value of Donated Property
(Feb. 2020), https://www.irs.gov/publications/p561 [https://perma.cc/ZWS6-ZZDX].
26. PRATT & NICULITA, supra note 24, at 1. “Market Value” and “Fair Market
Value” are two different terms where the former refers to the value that is decided by
the market whereas the latter should represent the asset’s true worth based on certain
conditions described above. See id.
27. See Treas. Reg., §§ 20.2031-1(b), 25.2512-1 (1992).
28. See James Chen, Fair Market Value (FMV), INVESTOPEDIA (Feb. 21, 2020)
[hereinafter Fair Market Value], https://www.investopedia.com/terms/f/fairmarketvalue
.asp [https://perma.cc/99ND-8UCA].
29. Sources of authority include statutory law, administrative rules, court
directions, and IRS authority. PRATT & NICULITA, supra note 24, at 13–14. Federal
statutes that contain valuation methods or material relating to valuation include the
International Revenue Code, U.S. Bankruptcy Code, and the Securities and Exchange
Acts. Id.
30. See Developments, supra note 18, at 49.
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Google Finance.31 Once these numbers are acquired, they are analyzed
under conditions such as earnings, growth rates, and the volatility of the
stock compared with the overall market: all publicly available
information.32 This is why accurate financial statements are extremely
important. Potential and current investors need accurate data to analyze
a company’s performance so that they can make an informed decision
on whether to invest.33 Because of the need for accurate financial data,
both Congress and the SEC have increased regulations in an attempt to
bolster the reliability of audited financials.34 Additionally, other public
trading platforms, such as the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), offer
their own manuals that impose requirements for companies to disclose
information that may materially affect the market for their securities. 35
These disclosures, in turn, affect the stock prices and valuations of the
companies.36
For private companies, valuation can be boiled down to the
“present worth of future benefits.”37 But what exactly does this mean
when private companies have little financial history and no public
oversight? A private company derives its valuation not based on the forvalue transaction expressed in the classical definition of value; rather, its
value is based on projections of what the company should be worth in
31. Private Company Valuation, CORP. FIN. INST. (2019), https://corporatefinance
institute.com/resources/knowledge/valuation/private-company-valuation
[https://perma.cc/FP6Z-VW5W]. The value of the public company is called “market
capitalization.” Id.
32. Developments, supra note 18, at 49 (citing Kathleen Pender, Are Unicorn
Valuations Part Fantasy?, S.F. CHRON. (May 13, 2015), http://www.sfchronicle.com/
business/article/Are-unicorn-valuations-part-fantasy-6261937.php
[https://perma.cc/
X93U-WEV5].
33. See id.
34. See HOWARD M. FRIEDMAN, PUBLICLY HELD CORPORATIONS: A LAWYER’S
GUIDE 69 (1st ed. 2011). These regulations have been implemented both in the
accounting and corporate professions. See id. at 68–70. For example, in 2002, after a
series of corporate scandals, Congress enacted the Sarbanes–Oxley Act. Id. at 70.
Additionally, the Securities Exchange Act § 13(b)(2) increased obligations on public
companies to file periodic reports with the SEC. See id. These obligations specifically
require companies to maintain records that are accurate as well as maintain measures to
ensure that internal accounting functions have a level of oversight in order to improve
accountability and accuracy. See id.
35. N.Y. STOCK EXCH., NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 202.05 (2020)
[hereinafter, NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL], https://nyse.wolterskluwer.cloud/
listed-company-manual [https://perma.cc/D4CQ-PGDQ].
36. Id.
37. PRATT & NICULITA, supra note 24, at 45.
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the future.38 Before their public market debut, privately-held companies
are usually valued using one of three dominant approaches: Comparable
Company Analysis (“CCA”),39 the Discounted Cash Flow (“DCF”)
method,40 or the First Chicago method.41 These methods, while different,
have one thing in common: They are based on predictions using the
limited data available to the public.42 Predictions, after all, are
expectations that may or may not come true. As discussed in Part III,
these faulty predictions may be the reason why many recent IPOs are
failing.
So, how are these companies raising money to boost their
valuation? Private companies usually raise capital through private
funding which occurs in “large, late-stage growth equity rounds.”43

38.
39.

Id.
The CCA Method involves comparing similar companies that are assumed to
have similar numbers to the target valuation. See James Chen, Comparable Company
Analysis (CCA), INVESTOPEDIA (Mar. 19, 2020), https://www.investopedia.com/terms/
c/comparable-company-analysis-cca.asp [https://perma.cc/66QL-G7C6]. Essentially it
is a method of “comparing” a similar company with more available data to the company
being valued. See id.
40. The DCF method involves not only comparing the average growth rates of
similar companies, like the CCA method, but it also involves discounting a future
forecast of a company’s free cash flow to today’s value. See What is a DCF Model?,
CORP. FIN. INST. (2020), https://corporatefinanceinstitute.com/resources/knowledge/
modeling/dcf-model-training-free-guide [https://perma.cc/Y8B4-4KJF]. “Free Cash
Flow” is cash that is available based on projections of the firm’s operating expenses,
taxes, and revenue. See id.
41. The First Chicago method involves taking the above methods and viewing
them through a lens of scenarios: best-case, base-case (the most likely outcome), and
worst-case scenarios. See First Chicago Method, THE BUS. PROFESSOR (Mar. 10, 2015),
https://thebusinessprofessor.com/lesson/first-chicago-valuation-method
[https://perma.cc/XU6W-6PY4]. Each of these scenarios is assigned a probability and
the ultimate number is achieved by taking the weighted average of the three. See id.
42. See Stanley J. Block, The Liquidity Discount in Valuing Privately Owned
Companies, 17 J. APPLIED FIN. 33, 33 (Fall 2007).
43. Christopher T. Holding et al., Private IPOs and Unicorns May Trigger More
H-S-R Act Filings, GOODWIN PROCTER (July 28, 2015), https://www.goodwinlaw.com/
publications/2015/07/07_28_15-private-ipos-and-unicorns-may-trigger-more-hsr-actfilings [https://perma.cc/8USG-5CZ9]. These large late-stage rounds are typical for
unicorns who presumably want to get that large valuation number. See Alex Wilhelm,
How Unicorns Have Helped Venture Capital Get Later, and Bigger, TECHCRUNCH
(Oct. 22, 2020, 12:10 PM), https://techcrunch.com/2020/10/22/how-unicorns-helpedventure-capital-get-later-and-bigger [https://perma.cc/XY8Z-J368]. The success of
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These private-stage rounds are characterized by investors receiving
preferred stock from the company, rather than the common stock sold in
an IPO.44 Essentially, the price of this stock is largely based on
negotiations between an investor and the company’s management.45
These negotiations, plus the added safeguards for venture investors,
such as senior liquidation preferences, have led to “generous investment
capital” before the acronym “IPO” is even whispered.46 These money
raising rounds have been described as “private IPOs.”47 Private IPOs do
not necessarily mean that the company will forgo traditional IPOs after
enticing early-round investors. However, they enable unicorns to
directly list on a stock exchange rather than continue on with the IPO
process.48
Are these pre-IPO negotiations the same negotiations referred to in
the classic definition of “value,” where a willing buyer and willing seller
come to an agreement on the price? In a classic fair market value sense,
the buyer wants the lowest price and the seller wants the highest price.49
Interestingly, in the pre-IPO context, a late stage investor may not have
these same interests,50 and therefore may not meet this typical buyerseller understanding.51 Specifically, a late stage investor uses an IPO to
procure an efficient exit that makes money,52 meaning that a buyer
these rounds may be a reason why unicorns are comfortable putting off their ultimate
IPO. See id.
44. Barry Kramer et al., The Terms Behind the Unicorn Valuations, FENWICK &
WEST (Mar. 31, 2015), https://assets.fenwick.com/legacy/FenwickDocuments/TheTerms-Behind-the-Unicorn-Valuations.pdf [https://perma.cc/WR9L-5U4V].
45. Developments, supra note 18, at 50.
46. See id. at 51.
47. Holding et al., supra note 43.
48. Amy Fontinelle, IPO vs. Staying Private: What’s the Difference?,
INVESTOPEDIA (July 8, 2019), https://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/102915/
ipo-vs-staying-private-pros-and-cons-each-model.asp [https://perma.cc/US88-KJ27].
49. See Fair Market Value, supra note 28.
50. See Flavia Richardson, The New Valuation Guidelines for Venture Capital and
Private Equity, MEDIUM (Apr. 8, 2019), https://medium.com/@flaviarichardso/the-newvaluation-guidelines-for-venture-capital-and-private-equity-9e857153ed96
[https://perma.cc/PYU2-SVE8].
51. Different stages of funding involve different considerations. See Nathan Reiff,
Series A, B, C Funding: How It Works, INVESTOPEDIA (Mar. 15, 2020),
https://www.investopedia.com/articles/personal-finance/102015/series-b-c-fundingwhat-it-all-means-and-how-it-works.asp [https://perma.cc/E4PU-J69U].
52. See Adam Hayes, Exit Strategy, INVESTOPEDIA (Mar. 26, 2020),
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/e/exitstrategy.asp [https://perma.cc/S5P2-NQLA].
IPOs are a type of “exit strategy” for existing investors. Id. An “exit strategy” is broadly
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wants a high valuation, not a low one.53 Perhaps this is a reason why the
valuation of private companies often misses the mark–there is no
opposing interest forcing the valuation to reach equilibrium. Instead, an
investor wants the valuation of the company to be high and therefore
does not want the lowest price desired by a typical buyer.54
B. THE ROLE OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS IN VALUATIONS
Usually, investors are able to break into the “black box” of private
companies by investing through big mutual fund companies like
BlackRock.55 This means that public investors can have a piece of the
pie—”baked” into their portfolios by a mutual fund—even before an
IPO occurs (and they may not even know it).56 However, even these big
mutual fund companies may inaccurately value the assets. 57 Essentially,
by aggressively investing in unicorns, mutual fund companies only add
to the unicorn’s nebulous valuation.58 For example, one of the ways in
which the valuations are misguided is that these mutual fund companies
are using a price that is calculated following new financing rounds, or
new rounds of share issuing, without distinguishing different types of
shares.59 This indicates that underlying differences in shares with
differing investor values may be treated as indistinguishable when
defined as a “conscious plan to dispose of an investment in a business venture or
financial asset.” Id. Examples of exit strategies include IPOs, management buy-outs,
and strategic acquisitions. Id. Every exit strategy requires a business valuation in order
to determine a sale price. See id. The purpose of an IPO, as well as other types of exit
strategies, is typically to limit losses. See id. Therefore, the investor’s interest is to
“exit” the company by selling shares of the private corporation to the public. See id.
53. See Kate Clark, Late-Stage Valuations Have Increased Nearly 20% in 2018,
PITCHBOOK (May 8, 2018), https://pitchbook.com/news/articles/late-stage-valuationshave-increased-nearly-20-in-2018 [https://perma.cc/SM2D-2D5Y].
54. See Andrew Sorkin, How Valuable Is a Unicorn? Maybe Not as Much as It
Claims to Be, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 16, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/16/
business/how-valuable-is-a-unicorn-maybe-not-as-much-as-it-claims-to-be.html
[https://perma.cc/WY5Y-YLSL].
55. See id. These mutual fund companies are examples of “institutional
investor[s].” James Chen, Institutional Investor, INVESTOPEDIA (Mar. 20, 2020),
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/i/institutionalinvestor.asp
[https://perma.cc/K3M3-XH7A].
56. See Sorkin, supra note 54.
57. Id.
58. See id.
59. See id.
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calculating the final valuation.60 Instead, these companies assume that
“all shares are as valuable as the most recently issued preferred
shares.”61 But in reality, some share classes are promised “valuationinflating terms,” such as return guarantees, vetoes over slumping IPO
prices, and seniority to other investors.62
C. THE COMPANY CAN PERFORM ITS OWN VALUATION INFLATION
Inflating valuation numbers may be easier than one might think.63
While some investors are promised a specific valuation price, other
investors might unknowingly make up the difference if that valuation
price is not realized after the company goes public.64 Essentially, if there
is a difference between a company’s numbers and their IPO goal, all
they need to do is issue more shares to make up the difference.65 The
common shareholders are unknowingly paying for this difference.66
Despite the problems that are arising with valuation mistakes,
regulation laws have barely knocked on the door of the unicorn club.67
Even the SEC’s definition of “value” for private companies seems
unhelpful.68 Section 2(a)(41)(B) of the Investment Company Act
60.
61.

See id.
Will Gornall & Ilya A. Strebulaev, Squaring Venture Capital Valuations with
Reality, 135 J. FIN. ECON. 120, 120 (2020). Private companies backed by venturecapitalists usually create a new class of equity every one to two years as they raise
money. Id. at 2. On average, a unicorn has eight share classes, each owned by different
groups of people such as employees, mutual funds, strategic investors, and founders. Id.
at 2–3.
62. See id. at 1.
63. See, e.g., Alex Morrell, Nearly Half of Tech “Unicorns” Rely on Tricky Math
to Land Imaginary Valuations, BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 2, 2017, 5:45 PM), https://
www.businessinsider.com/study-nearly-half-of-tech-unicorns-overstate-theirvaluations-2017-8 [https://perma.cc/JV9N-C2ZL].
64. Sorkin, supra note 54. For example, in 2015, Appdynamics issued a Series F
round where certain investors would receive a 20% bonus if the IPO fell in price. Id. In
other companies, some investors are promised twice their money back if the company is
sold, thereby enticing investors to purchase more. See id. Claims like these are common
and are used to entice investors and increase valuations. See id. Sorkin notes, however,
that the professors who pointed out these instances do not believe these claims are
meant to manipulate investors, even though that may be the outcome. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. See Fan, supra note 4, at 585.
68. See Chris B. Murphey, How to Value Private Companies, INVESTOPEDIA (May
14, 2020), https://www.investopedia.com/articles/fundamental-analysis/11/valuing-
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dictates that securities without readily available market estimates, are to
be valued at “fair value as determined by the Board of the Directors.” 69
Still, these directors are likely using the valuation methods described
above. Therefore, the fair value price is still based on fuzzy
predictions.70
As previously mentioned, most of this mismatch arises from a
unicorn’s private status, meaning that it is subject to decreased scrutiny
relative to a publicly held company.71 Therefore, investors of private
companies are looking at numbers contrived from projections created
without sufficient historical data.72 Because potential “future profits” are
weighted more heavily than historical data for a private company,73 one
New York Times writer suggests that the average unicorn is worth “half
of the headline price tag” of its valuation.74 Furthermore, if promises to
certain classes are considered,75 almost half of all U.S. unicorns would
fall below the billion-dollar threshold, thus forgoing their “club”
status.76
D. FROM VALUATIONS TO IPOS
Once these private companies have valuation numbers, most
prepare for an IPO hoping that their projected numbers will match the
listed price on the stock exchange.77 How does the company go public in
order to sell common stock? First, transactions must be registered with

private-companies.asp [https://perma.cc/QX55-W4Y9]. For a list of valuation cases, see
Recent SEC Mispricing Cases: Best Practices in Valuation, HOULIHAN CAP. (Dec. 20,
2019), https://www.houlihancapital.com/recent-sec-mispricing-cases-best-practices-invaluation [https://perma.cc/A8YY-G9DU].
69. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(41)(B).
70. See Fan, supra note 4, at 583–84.
71. See Developments, supra note 18, at 48–49.
72. Id. at 52–53. For example, public companies must disclose detailed earnings
and revenue trends. Id.
73. Id. at 53 (emphasis omitted).
74. Sorkin, supra note 54.
75. See Gornall & Strebulaev, supra note 61, at 122.
76. Id.
77. See generally id. In a traditional IPO, the company would have retained an
underwriter for the offering. See SEC INVESTOR BULLETIN, supra note 2, at 2. An
underwriter is an investment bank that manages and sells the IPO for the company. Id.
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the SEC for a company to offer or sell shares.78 To register an offering,
the company files a registration statement with the SEC through Form
S-1 or Form F-1 (for foreign issuers).79 The Securities Act imposes
standards on companies or persons engaged in the offer or sale of
securities to protect future investors by ensuring that investors are
provided with accurate information.80 For instance, a company must
include a “prospectus” as part of its registration statement.81 The
prospectus is “the offering document describing the company, the IPO
terms, and other information that an investor may use when deciding to
invest.”82 The SEC will use this registration statement and the included
prospectus to monitor a company’s compliance with disclosure
requirements and other securities law obligations.83 After appropriate
registration, the company may list shares on an exchange to begin
publicly selling shares.84
Companies rely on underwriters, which are sometimes banks, not
only in preparation for the IPO but also to help sell shares to the public
once the IPO launches.85 As with the registration requirements, IPOs and
underwriters are also governed by the Securities Act.86 Section 2(a)(11)
of the Securities Act defines “underwriter” as “any person who has
purchased from an issuer with a view to, or offers or sells for an issuer
in connection with, the distribution of any security, or participates or has
a direct or indirect participation in any such undertaking.”87
Underwriters play an integral role in the IPO process.88 Their role is

78. MARC I. STEINBERG, UNDERSTANDING SECURITIES LAWS 125 (7th ed. 2018).
The registration process is governed by the Securities Act of 1933. See id.
79. See Will Kenton, SEC S-1 Definition, INVESTOPEDIA (Mar. 19, 2020),
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/sec-form-s-1.asp
[https://perma.cc/Q5352UBH]; see also Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77f; 15 U.S.C § 78l.
80. See STEINBERG, supra note 78, at 125.
81. See
Form S-1 available at
https://www.sec.gov/files/forms-1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8ZHB-XTX7].
82. SEC INVESTOR BULLETIN, supra note 2, at 1.
83. See id.
84. 15 U.S.C. § 77e.
85. Allana Akhtar & Jennifer Ortakales Dawkins, Asana just said it’s doing a
direct listing—here’s how they work and why more companies are thinking outside the
box when it comes to going public, BUS. INSIDER (Feb. 4, 2020, 12:13 PM),
https://www.businessinsider.com/the-difference-between-a-direct-listing-and-an-ipo2019-6 [https://perma.cc/THQ3-QDUU].
86. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa.
87. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(11).
88. See STEINBERG, supra note 78, at 189–90.
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perhaps why the majority of the cost of an IPO is underwriter fees.89
Therefore, because the underwriter fee is connected to the overall IPO
price, both the company and the underwriters have an interest in
establishing a higher priced offering.90 Therefore, because of the
conflicted interests of the underwriters and the company, the SEC warns
potential investors that “the offering price may bear little relationship to
the trading price of the securities, and it is not uncommon for the closing
price of the shares shortly after the IPO to be well above or below the
offering price.”91
Finally, together with an IPO, a company going public must apply
to list shares on a stock exchange such as the NYSE or NASDAQ. 92
These stock exchanges have their own listing and valuation rules that
the company will have to follow.93 Changes to these rules have become
necessary as more companies deviate from the IPO path.
II. MOVE OVER IPOS, DIRECT LISTINGS HAVE ARRIVED
A. UNICORN IPO FAILURES SET THE STAGE
2019 was not kind to unicorns.94 Nearly half of all companies that
went public in 2019 were trading below their offer prices by the end of
the year, meaning that investors were losing hundreds of millions of

89. See Brent J. Horton, Spotify’s Direct Listing: Is it a Recipe for Gatekeeper
Failure? 72 SMU L. REV. 177, 185 (2019). A “large IPO” is typically an offering
greater than $301 million. Id. Other fees include the SEC registration fee, the listing
fee, printing costs, legal fees, and auditor fees. Id. Overall, the average cost of a large
IPO is over $44 million. Id.
90. See SEC INVESTOR BULLETIN, supra note 2, at 4. The underwriters would get
more compensation and the company has the possibility of raising more capital. See id.
91. Id. at 4–5. An IPO “fails” when the closing price falls well below the offering
price. Katsenelson, supra note 6.
92. See SEC INVESTOR BULLETIN, supra note 2, at 2.
93. See NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL, supra note 35, at § 102 et seq.
NASDAQ is currently awaiting approval from the SEC for a rule addressing direct
listings and valuations. See infra Part III.
94. Ben Winck, The IPO Market is Rebelling Against Many of 2019’s MoneyLosing Unicorns. Here’s What’s Scaring Investors Away—And What It Means for the
Future, MKTS. INSIDER (Oct. 2, 2019, 2:16 PM), https://markets.businessinsider.com/
news/stocks/ipo-market-outlook-trends-why-investors-rebelling-against-unicornsimplications-2019-9-1028570687 [https://perma.cc/7LKC-S3JG].
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dollars, sometimes in a single day.95 The SEC, seeing these trends, tried
to stop the bleeding through repeated warnings.96 For example, Mary Jo
White, a former SEC chair, warned private companies in a speech in
Silicon Valley that “being a private company comes with serious
obligations to investors and the markets.”97 However, because of the
regulatory framework’s current focus on public valuations, there is only
so much that the SEC can do to protect investors from a misguided
valuation.98
Peloton’s IPO was one of the biggest failures of 2019, following
Uber, Lyft, and Endeavor in the line of “high-profile IPO flops.”99 Uber
shares also fell on the first day of its IPO, with more than a 7% loss
(compared to Peloton’s 11%).100 Interestingly, despite these high-profile
failures, 211 companies went public in 2019.101 Some market critics
have suggested that, despite big-name IPO failures, IPOs continue to
trend because the overall approach to what an IPO means has
changed.102 Specifically, companies are going public as “a path to

95.
96.

See id.
See Nicolas Morgan & Brian Kaewert, Private Companies: Beware of SEC
Scrutiny, CFO (Apr. 22, 2019), https://www.cfo.com/fraud/2019/04/private-companiesbeware-of-sec-scrutiny [https://perma.cc/4V7X-W7FC].
97. Id.
98. See id. One way in which the SEC has tried to protect potential investors is by
pursuing private companies through fraud-related enforcement actions. See id.
Investors, too, can use this approach to protect themselves. See id. For example, before
Lyft was publicly traded, investors filed two class actions alleging that Lyft’s
disclosures were “overhyped”. Id. Many investors point to these lawsuits as evidence of
Lyft’s IPO faux pas. See id. Additionally, private companies often rely on Regulation D
of the Securities Act, which requires Form D filings. See 17 C.F.R § 230.506(b) (2015).
99. Theron Mohamed, Peloton Is the Latest in a Line of IPO Flops and Failures
This Year. Here Are 5 of the Biggest, MKTS. INSIDER (Sept. 27, 2019, 12:06 PM),
https://markets.businessinsider.com/news/stocks/peloton-joins-uber-lyft-wework-ipoflops-and-failures-2019-9-1028560037 [https://perma.cc/GA3C-KDS6]. Peloton was
privately valued at $4 billion in August 2018 and was seeking a public valuation of
about $8 billion. Id. It debuted as the third-worst unicorn IPO, losing 11% of its share
price on the first day of trading. Id. However, after a dip in mid-2020, Peloton is now
trading at over four times its IPO price. See Peloton Interactive, THE MOTLEY FOOL
(last visited Dec. 19, 2020), https://www.fool.com/quote/nasdaq/peloton-interactive/
pton [https://perma.cc/QN2M-TJVD].
100. Id.
101. Maureen Farrell, 2019: The Year of IPO Disappointment, WALL ST. J. (Dec 29,
2019, 5:30 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/2019-the-year-of-ipo-disappointment11577615400 [https://perma.cc/62G2-QAVB].
102. See id.
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profitability” rather than going public because of their profitability.103
However, it should be noted that there are still many companies (that are
not unicorns) that are continuing to see success after an IPO.104 Critics
caution, however, that the trends today are very reminiscent of the dotcom bubble of the 2000s.105 So, are recent unicorn IPO failures a sign
that a “unicorn bubble” is about to pop?106
The next section of this Note will discuss what some prominent
unicorns have done to escape this apparent IPO bubble and achieve the
success that only an IPO could once deliver, all while retaining their
unicorn status.
B. DIRECT LISTINGS OR PRIVATE IPOS: THE CURRENT REBELLION
TACTIC
Presumably because IPOs are no longer the only option, companies
are staying private longer107 or choosing to go public in a different
way.108 As hinted at the beginning of this Note, some unicorns have

103.
104.
105.
106.

Id.
Id.
Id.
See Les Brorsen, Looking Behind the Declining Number of Public Companies,
HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (May 18, 2017), https://corpgov.law.
harvard.edu/2017/05/18/looking-behind-the-declining-number-of-public-companies/
[https://perma.cc/A4RN-ZMNT]. IPOs peaked in the 1990s, but despite a decline, they
are raising more money now than ever before due to the extension of the private
financing stage. Id. It is important to note that this same article predicted a rebound in
2017-2018. Id. This may have been the case, but the number of IPOs does not indicate
their success. See id.
107. The average age of companies going public is 8, with tech companies waiting
on average until age 13. See Kate Rooney, This Year’s IPO Class is the Least Profitable
of Any Year Since the Tech Bubble, CNBC (Sept. 18, 2019, 7:32 AM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/09/18/this-years-ipo-class-is-the-least-profitable-of-anyyear-since-the-tech-bubble.html [https://perma.cc/5G74-BQ8Q]. According to one
Harvard article, the age of companies completing an IPO has steadily increased, from
six years in the years from 1996-2000, to eight years in the early 2000s, and then up to
10 years after the financial crisis. See David F. Larcker, Brian Tayan & Edward Watts,
Cashing It In: Private-Company Exchanges and Employee Stock Sales Prior to IPO,
HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Oct. 9, 2018), https://corpgov.law.
harvard.edu/2018/10/09/cashing-it-in-private-company-exchanges-and-employee-stocksales-prior-to-ipo [https://perma.cc/3R4E-U82X].
108. See infra Section II.C.
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decided to go public without an IPO backing.109 Spotify was the first to
lead a growing herd, followed by Slack.110 Both of these unicorns—and
this Note predicts more to come—decided to skip “middleman”
underwriters in favor of a direct listing.111
Knowing that they were breaking new ground, Spotify’s prospectus
contained the following warning:
[T]he listing of our ordinary shares on the NYSE without
underwriters is a novel method for commencing public trading in our
ordinary shares, and consequently, the trading volume and price of
our ordinary shares may be more volatile than if our ordinary shares
were initially listed in connection with an underwritten initial public
offering.”112

Recognizing the uniqueness of this move, Spotify hoped to stay
within the boundaries of the securities laws, while also warning
investors of unrecognized problems.113 Spotify recognized that with a
direct listing, its shareholders could resell their shares on the NYSE
immediately.114 However, as mentioned below, many of these
shareholders still needed to comply with Rule 144,115 which requires that
a minimum of sixth months to a year, depending on the type of
company, must elapse in order for the issuer or an affiliate of the issuer
to resell shares.116 Spotify made sure to register shares held by affiliated
109.
110.
111.

See supra Part I.
See supra Part I.
See Akhtar & Dawkins, supra note 85. Importantly, without an IPO, employees
and early investors are not mandated to wait to sell their shares when the company goes
public, in what is known as the “lock-up” period. Id.
112. Spotify Tech. S.A., Registration Statement (Form F-1) (Feb. 28, 2018)
[hereinafter Spotify Prospectus], https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1639920/
000119312518063434/d494294df1.htm#rom494294_4
[https://perma.cc/DL4NVEAQ].
113. See LATHAM & WATKINS, Spotify Case Study: Structuring and Executing a
Direct Listing 3 (2018) [hereinafter Spotify Case Study], https://www.lw.com/
thoughtLeadership/spotify-case-study-structuring-executing-direct-listing
[https://perma.cc/84X4-LKE8].
114. See id. at 1-2. Traditionally, shareholders would be unable to resell their shares
on a securities exchange without an IPO, after which, they would be restricted from
selling those shares immediately because of the “lock-up” or “lock-in” period discussed
above. See What is a Lock-up Period?, CORP. FIN. INST. (2020), https://
corporatefinanceinstitute.com/resources/knowledge/trading-investing/lock-up-period
[https://perma.cc/GJ4Y-M5XU].
115. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144 (2020)
116. See Spotify Case Study, supra note 113, at 4.
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issuers who did not meet the requirements of Rule 144.117 Those that had
already held shares for at least a year were able to escape registration
under the rule.118
Additionally, unlike an IPO, no set amount of shares were sold to
the public, and shares were not allocated at a set public price.119 Instead,
prospective buyers would place an order with someone of their choosing
at a price of their choosing; this price was based on what they believed
to be suitable.120 Again, this price is different than the typical price set
by a willing buyer and seller, as found in the classic fair market value
model.121 Therefore, every order contributed to the price rather than the
price being based on a previously arranged value set by the initial buyer
and seller.122
A direct listing is essentially where a company lets investors buy its
stock without hiring banks to analyze, demand, and set an IPO price. 123
Essentially, this allows the companies to delay going public through
rounds of venture group investments.124 Then, one or two large
investors, like Fidelity and, enter the mix to help with final steps. 125 In
the direct listing model, current investors can sell their shares on a stock
exchange directly without the help of underwriters (who are needed in
an IPO).126 Because the prices of these directly listed stocks are not
informed by underwriters, they are, instead, established by privatemarket transactions that utilize previously discussed valuation

117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 2.
Id.
See Fair Market Value, supra note 28.
Id.
Matt Levine, Unicorns Take Different Paths to Being Public, BLOOMBERG
(Mar. 27, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-03-27/unicornstake-different-paths-to-being-public [https://perma.cc/6XV9-SLE3].
124. See Sergey Chernenko, Josh Lerner & Yao Zeng, Mutual Funds as Venture
Capitalists? Evidence From Unicorns 1 (Harv. Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 18-037,
2017), https://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Publication%20Files/18-037_9e4595dd-5d56-408d
-addb-57c395ed760a.pdf [https://perma.cc/MT67-N6BJ].
125. See id. at 26–27.
126. Levine, supra note 123.
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methods.127 Therefore, without the stabilizing influence of a bank and
big mutual-fund shareholders, the stock price can be highly volatile.128
As a reminder, the final price listed on the stock exchange was
established by the valuation work done when raising money from
investors in the private stage.129 This means that “the late-stage private
investors now are doing the job that the post-IPO public investors used
to do.”130 Rather than paying bankers to spearhead an IPO, unicorns pay
them to set up the direct listing.131 Overall, unicorns are still saving
money because they are not paying banks to market the company to
investors in the public sphere.132
Furthermore, shareholders, rather than the banks, bear many of the
costs of the direct listing.133 In traditional IPOs, an underwriter
(generally a bank) does not charge the company fees when they sell the
stock. 134 Instead, they get an “underwriting discount,” which means they
purchase the stock from the company at a lower price and then sell it at
a higher price.135 Everyone who sells shares is paying that “discount” to
the bankers, meaning that shareholders pay around half of the bankers’
fees.136 In a direct listing, however, the company bears the cost of all the
bankers’ fees because those shares sold don’t have to then cover the
discounted shares given to bankers.137 Some of these new costs are
different, though, since the company should still educate investors,
rather than rely on investors’ general knowledge.138 For example, as it
prepared for its direct listing, Spotify educated prospective investors
through what it called “Investor Day.”139 Importantly, despite bearing all
127.
128.

See Private Company Valuation, supra note 31.
Maureen Farrell & Ana Rivas, The IPO Shortcut: A Direct Listing, WALL ST. J.
(Sept. 29, 2020, 4:05 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-ipo-shortcut-a-directlisting-11560976972 [https://perma.cc/AD8J-8FJP].
129. Levine, supra note 123.
130. Id.
131. Akhtar & Dawkins, supra note 85. According to this article, banks can charge
2-8% of the total capital raised when helping companies raise money. Id.
132. See id.
133. Levine, supra note 123.
134. See id.
135. See id.
136. See id.
137. See id.
138. See id.
139. See Spotify Case Study, supra note 113 at 5. Investor Day included
presentations from Spotify’s leadership team that were publicly streamed and accessible
around the world. Id. The Investor Day also qualified as a “road show,” as far as the
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of the costs, by using a direct listing, unicorns still pay a fraction of what
they had to pay underwriters in a typical IPO.140
C. THE BENEFACTORS OF IPOS AND DIRECT LISTINGS
Traditional IPOs and direct listings also differ in a very important
way: the recipient of the ultimate benefit.141 In a traditional IPO, the
issuer is selling the securities itself in order to raise capital for the
company.142 The primary issuance to shareholders is recorded on the
company’s balance sheet as stockholders’ equity.143 Furthermore,
outside of these IPO-derived shareholders, many existing shareholders144
are subject to what is called a “lock-up period,” a contractual period of
time set by the company’s underwriters.145 This contractually-defined
period prevents company insiders, employees, and other private
investors from selling their stock before the period lapses. 146
Importantly, even if this lock-up period was not defined, company

SEC was concerned, and therefore needed to meet the requirements of § 10(b) of the
Securities Act. Id.; see also 17 C.F.R. § 230.433(D)(8) (2020) and accompanying note.
Spotify’s publicly filed registration statement needed to include a “red herring”
prospectus as required by the SEC. See Spotify Case Study, supra note 113, at 5.
Spotify complied with this requirement by explaining that the price range, a necessary
element of this prospectus, would be determined by recent private transactions. See id.
140. See Farrell & Rivas, supra note 128.
141. For a full comparison, see A Current Guide to Direct Listings, GIBSON DUNN
(Dec.
3,
2019),
https://www.gibsondunn.com/a-current-guide-to-direct-listings
[https://perma.cc/5DCH-54FH].
142. See Jason Fernando & Julius Mansa, Initial Public Offering (IPO),
INVESTOPEDIA (Nov. 24, 2020), https://www.investopedia.com/terms/i/ipo.asp
[https://perma.cc/2GCG-UQMU]. Essentially, the issuer gets direct access to investor
funding by selling stock to the public and raising capital. See id.
143. Id.
144. See A Current Guide to Direct Listings, supra note 141, at 3. Existing
shareholders include company insiders. See id.
145. Id.
146. See Amy Fontinelle, How Long Is an IPO Lock-Up Period?, INVESTOPEDIA
(Jan. 7, 2019), https://www.investopedia.com/ask/answer/12/ipo-lockup-period.asp
[https://perma.cc/Y6ZK-4MY7]. The purpose of these lock-up periods is to stop early
investors from flooding the market with their shares, leading to a decrease in stock
price. See id.
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insiders would still be prevented from selling their stock unless the
designated time, established by Rule 144, had passed.147
Comparatively, in direct listings, the issuer is not receiving the
same immediate benefit of capital gain through selling public shares;
rather, existing shareholders are receiving the immediate benefit of
selling their own stock.148 These shareholders especially benefit because
they are not confined to the lock-up period typically seen in an IPO.149
However, direct listings still must comply with other obligations set by
regulators, including the SEC and the stock exchanges themselves.150
D. DIRECT LISTINGS ARE STILL ON A REGULATOR’S LEASH
In September 2019, SEC Chairman Jay Clayton indicated that the
SEC does not mind when companies go public through a direct listing as
opposed to a traditional offering.151 Following this announcement, in
October, the SEC held discussions on other alternatives to IPOs, which
included more conversations about direct listings.152 This came in the
wake of more and more Silicon Valley investors and advisers pushing
for direct listings over IPOs.153 The SEC appears to be on board with the
transition.154 A Latham and Watkins partner in attendance at this
discussion suggested that because “the SEC’s mandate is to have as
many public companies as possible,” facilitating an easier path for direct
listings is a logical step for the SEC to take.155 This apparent thaw in

147. See SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, RULE 144: SELLING RESTRICTED AND CONTROL
SECURITIES (Jan. 16, 2013), https://www.sec.gov/reportspubs/investorpublications/
investorpubsrule144htm.html. It is also important to recognize that the contractually
defined lock-up period created by the IPO underwriters varies depending on their
specific agreement. See Jason Fernando, Lock-up Agreement, INVESTOPEDIA (Oct. 8,
2019), https://www.investopedia.com/terms/l/lockup.asp.
148. See A Current Guide to Direct Listings, supra note 141, at 2.
149. See id. Because a direct listing bypasses the use of underwriters, it also
bypasses the lock-up period that goes along with them. See id.
150. See infra Section II.D.
151. Dave Michaels, SEC’s Clayton Says SEC Doesn’t Judge Direct Listings, WALL
ST. J. (Sept. 19, 2019, 12:28 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/secs-clayton-says-secdoesnt-judge-direct-listings-11568904829 [https://perma.cc/3PE5-XDEZ].
152. Miles Kruppa, SEC Opens Debate on Finding Alternatives to IPOs, FIN. TIMES
(Oct. 17, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/d9e59d5e-efcd-11e9-ad1e-4367d8281195
[https://perma.cc/Z7UA-323A].
153. See id.
154. See id.
155. Id.
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attitude towards direct listings, however, is very different from the
original sentiment of caution the SEC expressed when Spotify made the
decision to begin the process in 2017;156 essentially, the SEC’s
acceptance has been slow. Additionally, along with Spotify, the NYSE
also had to seek a rule change from the SEC, but its path towards
acceptance began earlier.157
The NYSE has “eased its rules” regarding listing requirements of
private companies in the past few years in order to compete with
NASDAQ, the original “go-to exchange for direct listings.”158 Nasdaq
has been the major venue for small companies who have traditionally
utilized the direct listing method.159 The Nasdaq private market allows
companies to privately trade their shares to institutional investors who
wish to buy into private companies at a discounted price.160 However,
over the past decade, these same investors urged small companies to
then register their shares for public trading after purchasing the shares
on the private market.161 Thus, after the filing and approval of
disclosures with the SEC, the companies would start to trade their stock
on an exchange.162 Spotify essentially wanted to do this too, but on a
much larger scale, since it was a much larger company.163
E. THE NYSE AND NASDAQ STEP IN TO HELP
As mentioned in the previous section, Spotify’s unprecedented
direct listing prompted the NYSE and the SEC to step forward and

156. Maureen Farrell & Alexander Osipovich, Bankers Begone! Spotify to Get
Clearance for an “Underwriter-Less” IPO, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 21, 2017, 5:33 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/bankers-begone-spotify-to-get-clearance-for-anunderwriter-less-ipo-1513852210 [https://perma.cc/PWR2-QMAB].
157. See id.
158. Id.
159. Robert Pozen, Spotify’s Direct Listing Is a Template for Unicorns Riding High,
FIN. TIMES (Jan. 30, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/46a35692-01ce-11e8-96509c0ad2d7c5b5 [https://perma.cc/N78Q-J53S].
160. See id.
161. See id.
162. See id.
163. See id.; see also Marc D. Jaffe, Greg Rodgers, & Horacio Gutierrez, Spotify
Case Study: Structuring and Executing a Direct Listing, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP.
GOVERNANCE (July 5, 2018), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/07/05/spotify-casestudy-structuring-and-executing-a-direct-listing [https://perma.cc/388W-RJLN].
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scramble to create regulations.164 On February 2, 2018, the SEC
approved the NYSE’s proposal to permit direct listings on the NYSE, so
long as the company also filed a resale registration statement pursuant to
the Securities Act.165 Before official approval was granted, like Nasdaq,
the NYSE had used its discretion to permit certain smaller direct listings
on a case-by-case basis.166 Specifically, the direct listing method is
permitted in Section 102.01B, footnote (E) of the NYSE Listed
Company Manual.167 The original footnote, before the 2019 proposed
rule, said that the NYSE would approve the listing of private companies
not previously registered with the SEC if the company could show “a
$100 million aggregate market value of publicly held shares.”168 The
company must also show the value of these shares based on: (1) an
independent third-party valuation; and (2) the company’s most recent
trading price for privately sold stock.169
Now, with the approved rule, the NYSE modified its Listing
Company Manual to better allow companies to list on the Exchange
without prior registration and with little private market-price history.170
Specifically, the NYSE proposed two changes to footnote (E) of the
Listed Company Manual.171 The first proposal was that the NYSE would
have the ability to determine that the company had met its market value
of publicly-held shares even if there was no recent private exchange
trading to observe.172 To do this, the company would have to provide a
recent valuation that would indicate that the company had met the

164.
165.

See supra Section II.D.
SEC Approves NYSE Rules to Facilitate Direct Listings, SKADDEN, ARPS,
SLATE, MEAGHER & FLOM (Feb. 8, 2018) [hereinafter SEC Approves NYSE Rules],
https://www.skadden.com/insights/publications/2018/02/sec-approves-nyse-rules-tofacilitate-direct [https://perma.cc/7VFU-YV4Y].
166. See id.
167. See NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL, supra note 35, at § 102.01B n.E.
168. Spotify Case Study, supra note 113, at 6.
169. See Notice of Filing of Amendment and Order Granting Accelerated Approval
of Proposed Rule Change to Amend Section 102.01B of the NYSE Listed Company
Manual, Exchange Act Release No. 82627, 83 Fed. Reg. 5650 (Feb. 2, 2018)
[hereinafter Notice of Approved Rule].
170. Id. at 5650. The SEC Rule refers to this private exchange as a “Private
Placement Market.” Id. Section 102.01B footnote (E) of the NYSE Listed Company
Manual also discusses specific factors that must be adhered to when relying on a
Private Placement Market Price. See id. at 5651–52.
171. Id. at 5651.
172. Id.
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market value of publicly-held shares of at least $250 million.173 This
would make it easier for clearly qualified companies (such as unicorns)
to list without showing both a valuation statement from a third party as
well as recent transactions from a private market, steps that the original
rule required.174 Because of this new rule, the company could use a
financial advisor to work with the NYSE’s designated market maker to
determine the opening price.175
The second rule change established more criteria to ensure that the
valuation agent is “independent” for purposes of footnote (E).176 For
example, the valuation agent cannot have provided any investment
banking services to the listing company within 12 months of the
submitted valuation.177 Additionally, the NYSE had proposed to amend
rules regarding the initial listing procedures of companies that do not
have recent trading on a private exchange or market; this, too, was
approved. 178 In essence, in an attempt to regulate the shadowy
valuations occurring behind closed doors, this new rule focuses on the
valuation methods used by private companies that are attempting to list
173. See Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change To Amend Section 102.01B of
the NYSE Listed Company Manual, Exchange Act Release No. 80933, 82 Fed. Reg.
28200, 28201, 28203 (June 20, 2017) [hereinafter Original Notice] (describing changes
to § 102.01B n.E of the NYSE Listed Company Manual).
174. See Notice of Approved Rule, supra note 169, at 5651 (explaining that the
original NYSE Listed Company Manual required a valuation of $100 million, but the
new rule requires a valuation of $250 million). The NYSE said that this “will give a
significant degree of comfort that the market value of the company’s shares will meet
the [$100 million] standard upon commencement of trading on the Exchange.” Id. at
5652. In other words, the NYSE believes that it is highly unlikely that a company with
a valuation of this amount would also fail to meet the normal $100 million requirement
upon listing. Id. at 5652 n.23.
175. Nicolas Grabar, David Lopez & Andrea Basham, A Look Under the Hood of
Spotify’s Direct Listing, HARV. L. SCH. F. on CORP. GOVERNANCE (Apr. 26, 2018),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/04/26/a-look-under-the-hood-of-spotifys-directlisting [https://perma.cc/G8HX-SX8Z]. For example, Spotify’s financial advisor was
Morgan Stanley. See id. The prospectus itself stated that the opening price would be
influenced by Morgan Stanley’s “understanding of the ownership of our outstanding
ordinary shares and pre-listing selling and buying interest in our ordinary shares that it
becomes aware of from potential investors and holders.” Spotify Prospectus, supra note
112, at 180.
176. See Notice of Approved Rule, supra note 169, at 5652.
177. See Original Notice, supra note 173, at 28202 (discussing § 102.01B n.E of the
NYSE Listed Company Manual).
178. See Notice of Approved Rule, supra note 169, at 5652.

2021]

UNICORN DIRECT LISTINGS

239

shares through direct listings and mandates that valuations must be
performed by competent agents.179
Importantly, in addition to the footnote (E) changes, the approved
rule also requires a filing of a resale registration statement under the
Exchange Act, subject to review by the SEC.180 Therefore, the company
must consider liability provisions under the Securities Act as well as the
Exchange Act.181 This dual consideration requires that the direct listing
regulatory process “unfold as if there is an IPO even when there is
not.”182 The proposed rule, after a variety of iterations, was approved on
an accelerated basis.183
The NYSE did not stop with this first rule related to direct listings,
which was largely limited to the reselling of securities by existing
shareholders.184 Rather, the NYSE attempted to further ease the path
towards direct listing with another proposal made in December 2019.185
This proposed rule would allow for “primary direct listings,” with which
a company, could itself list and sell its own shares on the NYSE on the
first day of trading.186 Essentially, with this newer proposal, direct listing
would not be limited to “shareholder direct floor listings” such as
Spotify’s, where only existing shareholders could resell their shares;
instead, an issuer would be able to sell newly issued primary shares on
its own behalf.187 After some road blocks, including a stay of the SEC’s
179.
180.

See SEC Approves NYSE Rules, supra note 165.
Andrew Brady, Phyllis Korff & Michael Zeidel, New NYSE Rules for Non-IPO
Listings, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Feb. 24, 2018), https://corpgov.law.
harvard.edu/2018/02/24/new-nyse-rules-for-non-ipo-listings [https://perma.cc/Q4URDVEN].
181. See id.
182. Grabar, Lopez & Basham, supra note 175.
183. See Cydney Posner, It takes a unicorn? SEC approves NYSE rule change to
facilitate direct listings, COOLEY (Feb. 23, 2018), https://cooleypubco.com/
2018/02/23/it-takes-a-unicorn-sec-approves-nyse-rule-change-to-facilitate-directlistings [https://perma.cc/QYT4-JR8N]. For example, one of the early iterations of the
proposal would have allowed a company to list immediately after filing a registration
statement without any Securities Act registration. See Notice of Approved Rule, supra
note 169, at 5651 n.11.
184. See Peter D. Hutcheon, Direct Listings on the New York Stock Exchange:
“Undertaking” Underwriting, NAT’L. L. REV. (Sept. 2, 2020), https://www.
natlawreview.com/article/direct-listing-new-york-stock-exchange-undertakingunderwriting [https://perma.cc/T26C-2UK8].
185. See id.
186. See id.
187. See id. In order to qualify for a Primary Direct Floor Listing, the company must
either “sell $100 million in market value of shares in the opening auction on the first
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initial approval from August 2020, the rule was finally approved again
in December 2020.188 As a result of the NYSE’s efforts, companies can
now more fully engage in the direct listing process as long as they have
filed an effective registration statement with the SEC.189
The NYSE was not the only exchange platform to realize that direct
listings needed assistance.190 Nasdaq also submitted a proposed rule in
February 2019 that was approved by the SEC shortly thereafter.191
Specifically, Nasdaq’s new rule clarifies the role of financial advisors in
direct listings, explains how Nasdaq will calculate the price
requirements for the listing, and requires that the direct listing is
accompanied by a registration statement under the Securities Act, only
for the purpose of allowing existing shareholders to resell shares. 192
Nasdaq also submitted an extension of these rules in a new proposal in
August 2019.193 This extension further defines a price-based initial
listing requirement and provides alternatives to private placement
market trading history for valuation.194
Both Nasdaq rules look almost identical to the NYSE’s approved
195
rule.
The NYSE, however, had to go through three different
amendments in order for the SEC to finally approve its rule.196 Coming
in second has its advantages. The SEC granted accelerated approval to

day of trading”; or, at the time of listing, have freely tradeable shares with a market
value of at least $250 million, “calculated using a price per share that is equal to the
lowest price in the price range set by the company in the Securities Act Registration
Statement.” Id.
188. Brian Hecht, Mark D. Wood & Mark J. Reyes, SEC Again Approves NYSE’s
Direct Listing Rules, NAT’L L. REV. (Jan 8, 2021), https://www.natlawreview.
com/article/sec-again-approves-nyse-s-direct-listing-rules
[https://perma.cc/3V6JGYVS].
189. See id.
190. See Notice of Approved Rule, supra note 169, at 5653.
191. See SEC Extends Review Period for Nasdaq Direct Listing Proposal, J.D.
SUPRA (Oct. 24, 2019), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/sec-extends-review-periodfor-nasdaq-86585 [https://perma.cc/9KTN-3TAY].
192. Id.
193. Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change, Exchange Act Release No. 86792,
84 Fed. Reg. 171 (Aug. 28, 2019) [hereinafter Notice of Proposed Nasdaq Rule].
194. See id. at 46582.
195. Compare Notice of Approved Rule, supra note 169, with Notice of Proposed
Nasdaq Rule, supra note 193.
196. See Notice of Approved Rule, supra note 169, at 5650.
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Nasdaq’s proposed rule on December 3, 2019.197 Additionally, Nasdaq
has once again attempted to follow in NYSE’s footsteps with their own
proposal for primary direct listings.198 Nasdaq’s proposal, filed on
December 22, 2020, is “‘virtually identical’ to that of the NYSE.” 199 If it
follows the previous accelerated approval process, Nasdaq’s approval
should be imminent.
Importantly for both exchanges, as soon as a company has listed
securities, the company is subject to reporting requirements, such as
reports that must be filed with the SEC, as well as corporate governance
requirements.200 Therefore, choosing a direct listing over an IPO does
not mean that a company avoids the SEC altogether.201 The next section
will discuss these requirements by looking directly at Spotify’s path.
F. THE PACK LEADERS: THE SPOTIFY AND SLACK APPROACH
Heeding the words of their financial and legal advisers, Spotify
approached the process of its direct listing carefully.202 Specifically,
Spotify implemented procedures similar to an IPO.203 First, in order to
start the process of a direct listing, Spotify registered its shares with the
SEC using Form F-1.204 Form F-1 is similar to a Form S-1, but is
specifically for foreign issuers.205 Both forms are required under the
Securities Act.206 However, because Spotify was not selling new shares
or coordinating existing shareholders, Form F-1 acted not as a
traditional registration statement, but rather as a resale registration
statement.207 Companies need to be careful when using Form F-1 in this
way because, depending on timing, the SEC may consider the resale of
shares a “distribution,” something that Spotify feared would happen. 208
197. See Order Granting Accelerated Approval of a Proposed Rule Change,
Exchange Act Release No. 87648, 84 Fed. Reg. 67308 (Dec. 3, 2019).
198. Hecht, Wood & Reyes, supra note 188.
199. Id.
200. See 15 U.S.C. § 78l (Exchange Act § 12(b)).
201. See infra Section II.F.
202. See generally Spotify Case Study, supra note 113.
203. See id. at 3.
204. Id.
205. Adam Hayes, SEC Form F-1, INVESTOPEDIA (June 9, 2020),
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/sec-form-f-1.asp
[https://perma.cc/U9FM8FZY].
206. 17 C.F.R. § 239.31 (2020).
207. Spotify Case Study, supra note 113, at 3.
208. Id. at 7.
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Resale registration statements are normally filed using a Form S-3 or
Form F-3.209 Filing with these forms was not possible for Spotify, since
a company can only use these forms if that company has already been
subject to the reporting requirements of the Securities Act for 12
months.210 Therefore, Spotify needed to rely on Form F-1 instead.211
However, in order to make sure that existing shareholders could in
fact resell their shares (and not experience the traditional lock-up period
found in an IPO),212 Spotify needed to either register all of its securities
or qualify for a Rule 144 exemption.213 Rule 144 allows securities to be
traded on a secondary market.214 In order to avoid becoming a
“distribution” in the eyes of the SEC, the shares must be held for the
period of time determined by Rule 144.215 Spotify explained as such in
their February 2018 prospectus under the “Shares Eligible for Future
Sale” section.216
Furthermore, in a “pure direct listing”, a company only needs to
comply with the Exchange Act, since the Securities Act is used for the
resale of shares.217 This was not the case for Spotify.218 In order for
Spotify to successfully complete an approved listing, its Form F-1
needed to contain information that complied with the Exchange Act and

209.
210.
211.

17 C.F.R. § 239.13 (2020); 17 C.F.R. § 239.33 (2020).
Spotify Case Study, supra note 113, at 10 n.7.
Id. Spotify submitted its prospectus and its 2018 first quarter financial
statements. See id. Spotify essentially found a way around the impossibility of
submitting a Form F-3 since it did not meet Form F-3s 12-month Exchange Act
reporting requirement. See id. F-1, in contrast to F-3, is a Securities Act form rather
than an Exchange Act form. Id. Registering with the SEC through Form F-1 allowed
existing shareholders to resell their shares registered on the registration statement. See
id. at 3.
212. Akhtar & Dawkins, supra note 85.
213. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.144 (2020); see Spotify Case Study, supra note 113, at 4.
According to Rule 144, a registration statement must be effective for a period of 90
days. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.144 (2020). Not only must the registration statement remain
open for 90 days, but a shareholder must have held his shares for at least six months
before selling them under Rule 144. See id.
214. See Elisabeth de Fontenay, The Deregulation of Private Capital and the
Decline of the Public Company, 68 HASTINGS L.J. 445, 468 (2017).
215. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.144 (2020); see also Spotify Case Study, supra note 113, at
7.
216. Spotify Prospectus, supra note 112, at 168.
217. Horton, supra note 89, at 190–91.
218. Id. at 191; see Spotify Case Study, supra note 113, at 4.

2021]

UNICORN DIRECT LISTINGS

243

the Securities Act.219 For instance, the prospectus needed to include a
price range of the anticipated sale price on the front page pursuant to
Item 501(b)(3) of Regulation S-K.220 This disclosure was not possible
for Spotify since the company was not offering any new shares (since it
was only reselling existing shares) or playing a role in pricing new
shares as it would in an IPO.221 Therefore, Spotify relied on a statement
warning potential investors that the price would be based on the buy and
sell orders collected by the NYSE.222 In an effort towards compliance
and transparency, Spotify included some numbers from recent private
transactions.223
Finally, Spotify’s prospectus needed to include a “Plan of
Distribution” section.224 To do this, Spotify again clarified, in detail, the
NYSE’s role by defining it as the “designated market maker” whereby
the NYSE would open the shares for trading and facilitate an orderly
market for Spotify’s shares “without coordination with Spotify.” 225
However, current regulatory laws did not overtly permit this novel
approach; this is why, as described in Section II.E., Spotify’s journey
towards a direct listing had to parallel the NYSE’s attempt to allow such
a move.226
G. THE SEC’S REVIEW PROCESS
How, though, did Spotify make sure that the SEC would accept this
novel approach thereby ensuring its success? On December 18, 2017,
Spotify decided to rely on the SEC’s confidential review process by
submitting a draft registration statement.227 A few months later, Spotify
publicly filed the registration statement as well as a brief statement

219.
220.
221.
222.
223.

See Horton, supra note 89, at 182 tbl.1.
Spotify Case Study, supra note 113, at 4.
Id.
See id.; see also Spotify Prospectus, supra note 112, at 1–7.
Spotify Case Study, supra note 113, at 4; Spotify Prospectus, supra note 112, at
8. In their February 2018 prospectus, Spotify warned that no public market for ordinary
shares existed, but that the ordinary shares had a history of trading in private
transactions. See Spotify Prospectus, supra note 112, at 8. After this warning, they
proceeded to list the low and high sales price for ordinary shares for private transactions
that took place in the preceding three months. See id.
224. Spotify Case Study, supra note 113, at 5; 17 C.F.R. § 229.508 (2020).
225. See Spotify Case Study, supra note 113, at 5.
226. See NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL, supra note 35, at § 102.01B n.E.
227. Grabar et al., supra note 175.
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using Form 8-A in order to register under the Exchange Act.228 Because
Spotify submitted Form F-1 as a resale registration statement rather than
just the typical registration statement called for by the Exchange Act, the
SEC had to analyze what this would mean.229
First, the Commission had to decide if this resale statement was
actually an “offering.”230 If it was, the next question would be “whether
such offering . . . would constitute a “distribution” for purposes of
Regulation M of the Exchange Act,” especially given Spotify’s Investor
Day and other educational initiatives.231 Regulation M is the SEC’s
“anti-manipulation rule that limits the market activity of distribution
participants.”232 The open question of whether Spotify’s resale statement
was, in fact, defined as an “offering” prompted Spotify to seek a noaction letter from the SEC.233 In this no-action letter, “the SEC Staff
agreed . . . that it would not recommend enforcement action against
Spotify . . . if the restrict[ion] period . . . commenced five business
days . . . prior to the commencement of trading.”234 However, like a
typical no-action letter, the SEC made sure to clarify that the letter only
applied to enforcement and did not represent any legal conclusions
regarding securities laws.235 But, despite the lack of legal precedent,
Spotify had accomplished its goal; it had successfully gone public
without an IPO.

228.
229.
230.
231.

Id.
Spotify Case Study, supra note 113, at 7.
Id.
Id. at 7, 11 n.13. Regulation M prohibits distribution participants such as
security holders and issuers from bidding, purchasing, or inducing a person to bid or
purchase during a specified time period. See id.
232. Spotify’s Direct Listing–A Look Under the Hood: Alert Memorandum, CLEARY
GOTTLIEB (Apr. 17, 2018), https://www.clearygottlieb.com/-/media/files/alert-memos2018/spotifys-direct-listing--a-look-under-the-hood.pdf [https://perma.cc/NL78-93RM].
233. Spotify Case Study, supra note 113, at 7.
234. Id.
235. Spotify Tech. S.A., SEC Staff No-Action Letter (Mar. 23, 2018),
https://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/mr-noaction/2018/spotify-technology032318-regm.pdf [https://perma.cc/433P-U3U8].
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H. SLACK CLOSELY FOLLOWS
With Spotify successfully paving the way, Slack, another tech
unicorn, now knew how to satisfy SEC requirements.236 Learning from
Spotify, the very first sentence of Slack’s prospectus clarifies that it
“relates to the registration of the resale” of its shares.237 The next
sentence goes on to say that the resale by the Registered Stockholders is
not being underwritten by an investment bank.238 Additionally,
paralleling Spotify, Slack finished its prospectus’s opening page by
informing readers that the stock price will be determined by the buy and
sell orders collected by the NYSE.239 Essentially, Slack knew what to do
to please not only the SEC but also the NYSE, successfully following in
Spotify’s footsteps.240
III. THE FUTURE OF DIRECT LISTINGS
A. WHICH UNICORN COULD BE NEXT?
Perhaps in the next year we will see other unicorn companies
following the same path as Spotify and Slack. For example, WeWork
may be one of the likely candidates for just such a move, especially
given its failed IPO attempt.241 After all, a direct listing is a way to cut

236. Maureen Farrell, Slack Plans to Follow Spotify on Unconventional IPO Route,
WALL ST. J. (Jan. 11, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/slack-planning-to-pursuedirect-listing-11547202723 [https://perma.cc/86VQ-2APB].
237. Slack Tech., Inc., Registration Statement (Form F-1) (Apr. 26, 2019).
238. Id.
239. Id. Slack described two categories of common stock: Class A and Class B,
which only differ with regards to voting rights and conversion rights. See id. Class A
stock, however, did not have any history of private trading and so the price had to be
determined by the NYSE as mentioned above. See id. Class B, though, had a range of
high and low sale prices per share of which Slack could disclose. See id.
240. Compare id., with Spotify Prospectus, supra note 112.
241. See Ben Ashwell, “WeWork” is a transformational moment, says OTC
Markets’ Paltrowitz, IRMAGAZINE (Nov. 1, 2019), https://www.irmagazine.com/smallcap/wework-transformational-moment-says-otc-markets-paltrowitz
[https://perma.cc/2YVQ-W4MC].
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some of the costs of a traditional IPO,242 and after the events of 2019,
WeWork is in need of as many cost-cutting initiatives it can find.243
An indicator that WeWork might be heading towards a direct
listing is the fact that WeWork “shelved its IPO at the last minute due to
a lack of investor interest.”244 WeWork originally filed for the IPO in
December 2018245 and filed an official prospectus in August 2019,
indicating its plan for an IPO.246 The prospectus even contained a
section devoted to underwriters employed by WeWork at the time.247
However, following a wave of negative publicity in 2019 and the impact
of pandemic conditions on the market in 2020, I predict that WeWork
will likely abandon this approach and join the direct listing pack when
the market rebounds. This theory seems to be supported by the fact that
in September 2019, WeWork officially requested the SEC withdraw its
IPO prospectus.248 This move may be the biggest indicator that a direct
listing for the company is in the making.
Comparatively, another unicorn, Airbnb,249 once seemed like a
perfect candidate for a direct listing.250 Airbnb originally disclosed in
2019 that it planned to go public in 2020.251 Many market insiders
242.
243.

See supra Section II.B.
See Nicholas Jasinki, WeWork Is Dropping Its Plan for an IPO, BARRON’S
(Sept. 30, 2019, 11:27 AM), https://www.barrons.com/articles/wework-asks-the-sec-towithdraw-its-ipo-prospectus-51569857248 [https://perma.cc/9XRH-NEUC].
244. Mohamed, supra note 99.
245. WeWork Files for Confidential IPO, PYMNTS (Apr. 29, 2019),
https://www.pymnts.com/news/ipo/2019/wework-files-initial-public-offering
[https://perma.cc/6DK2-6SND].
246. The We Company, Registration Statement (Form S-1) (Aug. 14, 2019).
247. Id. at 237.
248. See Jasinki, supra note 243.
249. Airbnb joined the Unicorn Club in 2011 and is now currently valued at $18
billion dollars as of Sept. 13, 2020. See The Global Unicorn Club, CBINSIGHTS (Oct. 7,
2020), https://www.cbinsights.com/research-unicorn-companies [https://perma.cc/
FN3J-HYVC].
250. See Ben Winck, Airbnb reportedly opts for direct listing over traditional IPO
ahead of 2020 market debut, MARKETS INSIDER (Oct. 1, 2019, 9:15 AM),
https://markets.businessinsider.com/news/stocks/airbnb-picks-direct-listing-over-ipo2020-market-debut-report-2019-10-1028567322 [https://perma.cc/XT5X-87GS].
251. See Airbnb, Airbnb Announces Intention to Become a Publicly-Traded
Company During 2020, AIRBNB NEWS (Sept. 19, 2019), https://news.airbnb.com/
airbnb-announces-intention-to-become-a-publicly-traded-company-during-2020
[https://perma.cc/V5NC-QMJX]; see also Olivia Carville & Sonali Basak, Airbnb
Leans Toward Direct Listing Over Traditional IPO, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 1, 2019),
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suspected that Airbnb might opt for a direct listing, mirroring Spotify’s
success.252 However, after months of silence, Airbnb finally announced
a confidential submission of a draft registration statement to the SEC in
August 2020.253 Draft statements usually signal a pending IPO.254 This
came as a surprise to many, since the announcement occurred during the
pandemic when the economy remained extremely uncertain.255
However, because the stock market is experiencing record highs despite
continued pandemic fears,256 Airbnb may have felt confident that it
would share in the market’s success.
Despite market uncertainty and the opportunity to join the direct
listing herd, Airbnb recently went public through a traditional IPO in
December 2020.257 Even though Airbnb’s IPO seemed like a success
initially,258 Airbnb faced falling stock prices with shares down 25% just
a week after debuting.259 In retrospect, looking at these falling numbers,
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-10-01/airbnb-is-planning-for-directlisting-instead-of-traditional-ipo [https://perma.cc/9ZQ2-7HRF].
252. Levi Sumagaysay, Airbnb files for IPO that was “hard to imagine” just a few
months ago, MARKETWATCH (Aug. 22, 2020), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/
airbnb-files-for-initial-public-offering-11597870063 [https://perma.cc/FZZ9-4374].
253. Airbnb Announces Confidential Submission of Draft Registration Statement,
AIRBNB (Aug. 19, 2020), https://news.airbnb.com/airbnb-announces-confidentialsubmission-of-draft-registration-statement [https://perma.cc/SW33-4TSZ].
254. See LATHAM & WATKINS, U.S. IPO GUIDE 6 (July 31, 2020),
https://www.lw.com/thoughtLeadership/lw-us-ipo-guide
[https://perma.cc/L2Q4PCYK].
255. See Sumagaysay, supra note 252.
256. See Barbara Friedberg, Why the Market is Booming and the Economy is
Struggling, U.S. NEWS (Sept. 15, 2020), https://money.usnews.com/investing/stockmarket-news/articles/why-the-market-is-booming-and-the-economy-is-struggling
[https://perma.cc/F92F-GGPC]. The article refers to the “Fed Model” which describes
the interest rates and federal monetary policy set by the Federal Reserve. Id. The Fed is
meant to control inflation and maintain stability during volatile times. Id. Many believe
that it is this model that allows the market to remain stable even if the economy is
suffering. See id. Of course, these same people still warn that the future remains
unknown regardless of government help and a booming market. See id.
257. See Adam Uzialko, U.S. SEC Expands the “IPO On-Ramp” Provision of the
JOBS Act, BUS. NEWS DAILY (July 11, 2017), https://www.businessnewsdaily.com/
10074-sec-jobs-act-ipo-confidential-registration.html [https://perma.cc/95BW-32YX].
258. See Keith Noonan, Why I didn’t go All In On the Airbnb IPO, THE MOTLEY
FOOL (Dec 20, 2020), https://www.fool.com/investing/2020/12/20/why-i-didnt-go-allin-on-the-airbnb-ipo [https://perma.cc/PB7U-H6L4]. Like this Note, the article is
skeptical of overblown tech company valuation numbers. See id.
259. See Johnathan Ponciano, Airbnb Stock Down 25% Since IPO, Three Billionaire
Cofounders Lose $5 Billion In 3 Trading Days, FORBES (Dec. 15, 2020),
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it is surprising that Airbnb went through with an IPO after witnessing
companies like Uber experience this same downfall.260 Furthermore, it is
even more surprising that Airbnb chose to go public as a company that
makes money off of travel, especially since it was “net-harmed by
Covid.”261 I am simply arguing that perhaps Airbnb could have avoided
the price drop following the IPO if it had used a direct listing. If
anything, Airbnb could have at least saved on underwriting fees. Why
not play it safe in an unsafe and unstable world? Perhaps Airbnb’s
experience is another indicator to still-private unicorns that direct
listings may be the better option.
Regardless of Airbnb’s choice to toe the usual party line, I firmly
believe that Spotify has left a legacy that other companies will utilize.
After all, even if bigger unicorns do not ultimately decide to use the
direct listing method, smaller unicorns may still find it appealing—a
trend that seems to have already begun.262 For example, after
confidentially filing an S-1 statement with the SEC, Asana, a workplace
productivity platform, announced its plan for a direct listing in February
2020.263 More than half a year later, Asana officially listed shares on the
NYSE in September 2020.264 Asana was the brain child of Facebook’s
co-founder Dustin Moskovitz and his business partner, Justin
Rosenstein.265 Asana’s successful direct listing resulted in a $5.5 billion

https://www.forbes.com/sites/jonathanponciano/2020/12/15/airbnb-down-25-since-ipothree-billionaire-cofounders-lose-5-billion-in-3-trading-days/?sh=238ef6ab2065
[https://perma.cc/3BGF-QXY5].
260. See Katsenelson, supra note 6 and accompanying text.
261. See Alex Wilhelm, How the Pandemic Drove the IPO Wave We See Today,
TECHCRUNCH (Nov. 21, 2020), https://techcrunch.com/2020/11/21/how-the-pandemicdrove-the-ipo-wave-we-see-today [https://perma.cc/HF8H-89GM].
262. See Lucas Matney, Asana Files to Go Public Via Direct Listing, TECHCRUNCH
(Feb. 3, 2020), https://techcrunch.com/2020/02/03/asana-files-to-go-public-says-it-willdo-so-via-a-trendy-direct-listing [https://perma.cc/ZSJ9-FWR3].
263. See id.
264. See John Swartz, The Asana non-IPO: 5 Things to Know About Direct Listings
of Facebook co-founder’s Software Company, MARKETWATCH (Sept. 30, 2020),
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/5-things-you-need-to-know-about-asanas-directlisting-2020-09-15 [https://perma.cc/2GCF-QFJY]; see also Collaboration Software
Unicorn Asana Selects September 30 for NYSE Direct Listing Date, RENAISSANCE CAP.
(Sept.
9,
2020),
https://www.renaissancecapital.com/IPO-Center/News/70963/
Collaboration-software-unicorn-Asana-selects-September-30-for-NYSE-direct
[https://perma.cc/AZ77-93MA].
265. See Matney, supra note 262.
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valuation,266 a higher number than expected.267 While Asana is
technically a unicorn, it is a much smaller company than Spotify and
Slack.268 Nonetheless, I predict that even if older and larger unicorns like
Airbnb and WeWork get cold feet, Asana will pave the way for a
younger herd of unicorns looking for potential money-saving options.269
One way or another, direct listings are here to stay.
B. IS IT REALLY A REVOLUTION?
All in all, unicorns are probably the only species that would be able
to survive the direct listing process.270 By using their brand name
recognition, private-investor support, and capital, unicorns are able to
forgo an IPO and opt for a direct listing.271 The bigger question remains,
however, whether unicorns themselves will survive, given growing
concern over their valuation methods.272
As more and more unicorn IPOs fail to meet expectations, public
markets will perhaps realize that at times, the “private valuations of
billion-dollar start-ups have missed the mark.”273 As mentioned in Part I,
unconstrained hypergrowth of these companies on private markets can
lead to extreme overvaluations and disappointed investors.274 Simply
put, massive private valuations are not matching public markets, and the
financial world is catching on.275 This Note suggests that scrutiny of
these companies will continue to grow as investors become even more
wary of companies with extreme valuations.

266. Bloomberg, Asana Valued at $5.5 billion After Direct Listing Debut, L.A.
TIMES (Sept. 30, 2020), https://www.latimes.com/business/story/2020-09-30/asanadirect-listing [https://perma.cc/LL48-FRY6].
267. See Swartz, supra note 264. According to the article, Asana’s market valuation
was predicted to range from $3.7 billion to $4.3 billion after its direct listing. Id.
268. Id. Asana was valued at $1.5 billion as of 2018, during which it raised $50
million through Series E funding. See The Complete List of Unicorn Companies, supra
note 12.
269. See Akhtar & Dawkins, supra note 85.
270. See id.
271. See id.
272. See supra Section I.C.
273. Steve Kovach, This Year’s Disappointing IPO Class Is Causing a “Reckoning”
Among Private Investors, CNBC (Sept. 30, 2019), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/09/30/
new-ipos-face-reckoning-over-lofty-private-valuations.html
[https://perma.cc/H977N8DN].
274. Id.
275. Id.
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I believe that the SEC is correctly attempting to promote the
success of these unicorns through each subsequent rule approval,
allowing for an easier direct listing path for future issuers. With
increasingly flexible regulations, it seems probable that many unicorns
will utilize the direct listing approach in an effort to bypass underwriter
fees and decrease the probability of an unsuccessful IPO. As Spotify’s
CFO Barry McCarthy has stated, companies simply do not want to deal
with the “shenanigans” of the traditional IPO.276
C. RECENT UNPRECEDENTED FACTORS
However, these events preceded the global turmoil unleashed by
COVID-19. Due to the pandemic, the attractiveness of direct listings
seems to have diminished given the rising number of IPOs this year. 277
This makes sense considering that current market volatility and general
uncertainty make the direct listing an uncertain proposition at best
especially given its novelty. On the other hand, because some unicorns
are still experiencing less than successful IPOs despite their continued
prominence,278 companies could be pushed to the direct listing
alternative. After all, as this Note discusses,279 direct listings offer lower
costs and a way out with some hope of a financial return for existing
shareholders. As the public health crisis continues through 2021, only
time will tell if companies like WeWork will join the 2020 IPO boom280
or enter the market through a direct listing.
CONCLUSION
This Note suggests that direct listings, like unicorns, may exit the
mythical realm and become a very real presence in the financial world.

276. See Mark Baker, Direct Listings: The Future According to Goldman Sachs,
EUROMONEY (Oct. 16, 2019), https://www.euromoney.com/article/b1hm1tkx86xrzy/
direct-listings-the-future-according-to-goldman-sachs [https://perma.cc/EF64-UHUR].
277. See Teare, supra note 14.
278. See Noonan, supra note 258.
279. See supra Part II.
280. See Ciara Linnane, IPO Market is Headed for Busiest Third Quarter Since the
Dot-com Years, MARKETWATCH (Sept. 29, 2020, 1:17 PM), https://www.
marketwatch.com/story/ipo-market-is-headed-for-busiest-third-quarter-since-thedotcom-years-and-theres-lots-more-to-come-2020-09-28
[https://perma.cc/7XC7RYQG].
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This prediction seems especially strong in light of recent companies
either shelving their IPO plans altogether281 or experiencing falling share
prices after a traditional IPO.282 The SEC, the NYSE, and Nasdaq have
all taken steps to allow for ease in using the direct listing method, which
seemingly supports the theory that more companies may choose direct
listings over IPOs. However, only time will tell if companies will indeed
follow in Spotify and Slack’s footsteps, or if high valuations coupled
with the attractions and comforts of the traditional IPO will convince
rising companies to stick with underwriters.

281.
282.

See Jasinki, supra note 243.
See Ponciano, supra note 259.

